The management of inter-state rivers as demands grow and supplies tighten: India, China, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh by Crow, Ben & Singh, Nirvikar
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The management of inter-state rivers as
demands grow and supplies tighten:
India, China, Nepal, Pakistan,
Bangladesh
Ben Crow and Nirvikar Singh
University of California, Santa Cruz
March 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12433/
MPRA Paper No. 12433, posted 31. December 2008 06:39 UTC
  
 
 
The Management of Inter-State Rivers as Demands Grow and 
Supplies Tighten: 
India, China, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh 
 
 
Ben Crow 
Department of Sociology 
University of California 
Santa Cruz, CA 95064 
 
Nirvikar Singh 
Department of Economics 
University of California 
Santa Cruz, CA 95064 
 
 
March 2008 
 
 
 
 
The Management of Inter-State Rivers as Demands Grow and 
Supplies Tighten: 
India, China, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh  
Abstract 
International cooperation over the major rivers in South Asia took a new 
turn with the signing in 1996 and 1997 of five innovative water, power 
and economic cooperation agreements. The innovations include four 
elements:  (i) the transfer of some previously diplomatic questions into 
the sphere of the private economy, (ii) bringing third parties, other than 
governments, into the design and negotiation of cooperative projects, 
(iii) the principle of sharing costs and benefits, and (iv) taking steps 
toward multilateral discussion. However, political and implementation 
challenges have remained, and have been exacerbated by looming water 
shortages as economies grow and climate change occurs. This paper 
examines how recent innovations in diplomacy may be extended to 
address these challenges. 
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I Introduction 
The great rivers of South Asia, particularly the Ganges and Brahmaputra, have 
been the subject of five decades of discussion between governments of the region. 
While those discussions have continued, these rivers have contributed, through 
flood and drought, to the uncertainty and impoverishment of the lives of the largest 
concentration of poor people anywhere in the world.1 Prosperity will come from 
harnessing the potential of these rivers for irrigation and power, by controlling 
their perils (such as floods), and managing them in the face of increasing demands 
and threats to supplies from climate change. This paper explores some of the 
possibilities opened up by recent innovations in international cooperation, as well 
as the new challenges.  
We seek to address two challenges in particular. The first is that water flows are 
being changed by global warming. Glaciers and accumulated snow bodies are 
beginning to melt as global temperatures rise, and the pattern of monsoon and other 
precipitation may be changing. These changes will affect both the quantity of water 
supplied by South Asian rivers and the seasonal pattern of flows; river flows vary 
significantly between dry and monsoon seasons. Patterns of agriculture, residence, 
water supply, industry and riverine adaptation have been deeply influenced by this 
seasonal pattern. With glacial melting, flows may increase substantially (Milly, 
Dunne &  Vecchia 2005: Figure 4) and flood peaks may shift to earlier in the year. 
So, climate induced changes in flows and their seasonal pattern could have 
significant impact on lives and livelihoods in large parts of Northern South Asia.  
The second challenge we seek to address concerns industrialization. Both India, 
and its large neighbor to the North, China, have been rapidly industrializing in 
recent years with sustained rates of economic growth in double figures. Industrial 
demand for water is a small proportion of water demand in South Asia at present. 
The large majority of water consumption is for use in agriculture and that 
consumption may continue to rise for several decades. In addition, the experience 
of industrialized countries suggests that industrial demand may gradually rise to 
equal or exceed agricultural use. As industrial demand for water rises in India, 
tensions over water with Pakistan and Bangladesh may increase.    
A major new variable in the international management of South Asia’s rivers 
comes from outside the region. The Brahmaputra-Tsangpo, which flows through 
India and Bangladesh, has its origin and main length in the Tibetan plateau. The 
total flow of the Brahmaputra exceeds that of the Ganges. China is therefore a 
significant potential player in the strategic game of managing South Asia’s rivers. 
After the massive Three Gorges dam project, Chinese policymakers have been 
considering damming the Tsangpo, among other large domestic water projects. But 
only this project has direct consequences for other nations. It is easy to recognize 
also that Chinese policy announcements in this matter are implicitly linked to other 
strategic issues such as trade and the boundary dispute with India. China’s size and 
power make it impossible to ignore, even when its plans are at the level of 
speculative ideas. Till now, there have been no reports of negotiations between 
India and China over water.  
In this first section, we describe the challenges of managing South Asian rivers, 
including a discussion of the relationship and differences between flood problems 
and potential benefits of irrigation and power generation, and . We also provide an 
overview of the region's international relations over water, and outline new 
directions enabled through multi-track diplomacy.  
Section II introduces a range of conceptual issues relevant for negotiations over 
flood mitigation and water development: conflict over the allocation of property 
rights, who is included in the bargaining process, the scope of their negotiations, 
and the rules that govern the process. Section III introduces the concept of multi-
track diplomacy, and applies it to the case of international river management.   
Sections IV and V examine past problems with bilateralism, and the innovations 
incorporated in the five treaties signed in 1996 and 1997, how they relate to multi-
track diplomacy, and how they address some of the past obstacles to successful 
agreement as discussed in Sections II and IV, and the subsequent implementation 
problems that have arisen. Section VI concludes by considering directions in which 
current innovations might be extended as bases of regional cooperation, using the 
multi-track diplomacy framework. 
At the end of section V, we describe the wave of Himalayan water projects being 
designed and constructed at the beginning of the C21st. There are substantial issues 
to be addressed by an expanded group of countries depending on Himalayan rivers. 
We suggest that an independent regulatory agency could facilitate rational 
development, assist in the management of substantial uncertainties about future 
flows, and reduce the potential for conflict.  
The problems and the promise of South Asian rivers 
South Asian governments seek to control the great rivers of their region2 because 
river control offers partial, but tangible, solutions to the most fundamental 
problems of rural poverty, industrial constraints, and urban stress that those 
governments seek to address. Often, the ways in which control has been sought -- 
through national visions, covert appropriation and bilateral bargaining -- constrain 
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what can be achieved. Climate change will complicate an already difficult 
situation, by increasing uncertainty and reducing supplies of water. 
A significant community of scholars, officials and politicians3 in South Asia 
argues that the region's rivers can be better harnessed in support of economic 
development.  For example, George Verghese, a prominent former Indian-
newspaper-editor and long-time proponent of river development, has written:  
There is no reason why the immiserised population of this resource-rich 
[Ganges] Basin should remain poor and hostage to a recurring cycle of 
devastating flood and drought. There is sufficient indication that 
international funding and technical assistance will be forthcoming in 
ample measure if the Basin-states decide cooperatively to harness the 
waters of these mighty rivers, green the mountains and conserve ‘losing 
ground’.4
A complementary view (Boyce, 1987), agrees about the promise of water 
development, and argues that conflict between rich and poor hinders the emergence 
of local cooperative institutions which could employ water resources effectively. 
Together these arguments make a powerful case for those types of river 
development which recognize the political and economic forces shaping current 
conflict at international and local levels.  
To make more precise the different issues involved, we can identify three areas 
where there are potential benefits to be gained from improved water management 
and development. These are flood mitigation, water consumption (for agriculture 
and industry, as well as for drinking and other human uses), and power generation. 
In different circumstances one or two of these areas may be more salient, but they 
are typically interconnected. In some cases, this linkage is positive: for example, a 
single dam may assist in flood mitigation, water consumption and power 
generation. In other cases, however, there can be negative relationships, where 
pursuing water development for one goal, such as flood mitigation, may limit water 
consumption for a set of users. The specificity of these relationships with respect to 
topography, hydrology, social institutions and other factors complicates analysis 
and implementation of policies to actualize any potential benefits. Further 
complications come about from uncertainty, lack of technical expertise, lack of 
understanding of interrelationships among technical, social and environmental 
factors, and diversity in the locus of beneficiaries and those who bear the (often 
substantial) costs involved in realizing benefits. Many of these issues underlie our 
subsequent discussion. 
 3
In 2008, a substantial phase of hydroelectric power development is underway in 
India, Nepal, Pakistan, and not least China. Concerns to expand, and ensure 
reliability of, electricity supply for industrial and urban uses in India and China, 
and to avoid the greenhouse gases of coal-fired power generation, lie behind this 
phase of water development.  
Wood (1999: 731) reminds us that ‘water management is a democratic not a 
technocratic issue.’ And, in several parts of South Asia, water development has 
become the focus of social organization (Phadke 2002; Agarwal and Narain 1997; 
Adnan 1993). Flood mitigation, in particular, is centrally about democratic 
representation as well as technical possibility. The demise of the G8-backed 
Bangladesh Flood Action Plan underlines that conclusion.  This well-intentioned 
and potentially well-financed initiative foundered when groups of donors disagreed 
over the best approach to take to flood mitigation, and most centrally, when it 
became apparent that local and international nongovernmental agencies opposed 
the plan. Much good research and investigation was funded in the aftermath of the 
plan, but the initiative to finance flood mitigation schemes was lost (Wood 1999; 
Adnan 1993; Paul 1995; World Bank 1997). 
Flood mitigation has diffuse consequences for livelihoods, and requires popular 
support for its implementation. Therefore, where international negotiations are 
involved, the democratic space for negotiation opened by multi-track diplomacy 
may be preferable to the confines of intergovernmental negotiation. These benefits 
may also be realized with respect to international management of water 
availability, which promises to be an increasing problem as demands grow along 
with the region’s economies, and as climate change starts to affect sources of 
supply. Through improved representation of multiple stakeholders, multi-track 
diplomacy could generate better plans and wider political support for those plans. 
 
II Facilitating Cooperation: Conceptual Issues5
In this section, we describe in abstract the problems in achieving cooperation, and 
how these arise in the case of managing international. Cooperation can occur when 
mutual benefits are possible.  However, the existence of mutual gains is not 
sufficient for cooperation: the prisoner's dilemma is the most famous example of 
failure to achieve mutual gains.  In the prisoner's dilemma game – given the 
relative payoffs of different courses of action – the inability to communicate and, 
especially, to commit to a binding agreement, are the sources of this failure.  In the 
case of international diplomacy, constraints on communication may matter, but the 
inability to enforce agreements is more likely to be a problem.  
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Cooperation can be achieved in a prisoner's-dilemma-type situation by changing 
the structure of payoffs. This may be done, for example, through allowing for 
repeated interactions, the existence of certain kinds of asymmetric information 
about the preferences of players,6 the ability to punish violation of agreements, or 
tying the game to other games that are also taking place between the players.  The 
game remains one of noncooperative behavior, but such behavior can support a 
cooperative outcome in the expanded game.  While some types of asymmetric 
information help resolve the prisoner's dilemma, in other cases, incomplete 
information makes achievement of mutual benefits limited or even impossible, this 
being a version of the “lemons problem.”7   
This abstract discussion helps to focus on the following questions in discussing 
how cooperation in the management of water resources may be facilitated.  First, 
are there truly potential mutual benefits, or is the situation one of conflict (one 
party can only gain at another's expense)?  Second, if the answer to the first 
question is negative, can the situation be redefined (e.g. broadened in scope by 
considering other dimensions, or repeated interaction) to transform it to one of 
potential mutual benefit?  Third, what are the impediments to actually achieving 
mutual benefits: uncertainty, asymmetries of information, exclusion of key parties 
affected by the transaction, or inefficient bargaining protocols?  Obviously, the 
answers to all three questions will overlap.  We will explore the experience of 
international negotiations over the use of South Asia's water resources in this 
framework.  To illustrate, we briefly consider the Indus waters case. 
Which governments ‘owned’ the five rivers making up the Indus system was the 
basis of dispute between India and Pakistan after independence and partition in 
1947.  There was uncertainty about property rights, which made any de facto 
property rights of limited value. However, any division of the flows was viewed as 
potentially providing a gain to one side at the expense of the other. This is the 
common problem in the allocation of property rights: mutual benefits from 
agreement are unclear or nonexistent.  The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 
established that the rivers would be divided between India and Pakistan. This 
division resolved the property rights, but to either Pakistan or India’s disadvantage, 
depending on who bore the cost of investments required to make the proposed 
division workable. Intervention that changed the nature of the game came in the 
form of external funding via the World Bank.  Secure property rights and financing 
from the World Bank allowed each country's share of the system to provide much 
more than could have been achieved while property rights were uncertain.   
The example illustrates answers to the first two questions above: a situation of 
conflict was transformed in a simple way to one of mutual benefit, by a third party 
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“sweetening the deal.”  The answers, and the solution to the problem, however, are 
both limited.  The theoretical issue of why the World Bank intervened can be 
answered briefly: the geopolitical incentives underlying that institution and its 
backers determined this role.  The practical solution to the Indus waters problem 
was limited, however, because the waters that “belong” to Pakistan partly flow 
through Indian territory.  If optimal usage of these waters requires large fixed 
investments, a different set of issues, well beyond the allocation of property rights 
to water, arise.  In fact, these issues have prevented such investment occurring. To 
the extent that flood mitigation requires such investments, the difficulties are 
greater than those inherent in the case of agreeing on the sharing the Indus waters.  
We turn to these issues after discussing the problem of allocation of property 
rights.   
Conflict and cooperation 
A situation of pure conflict is one where no mutual benefits are possible: in a 
bilateral negotiation, a gain for one party must result in a loss for the other.  A 
simple reallocation of property of rights is therefore a situation of pure conflict.  
Therefore, to the extent that international river disputes are disputes over property 
rights, one would be pessimistic about resolving conflict.  Only when property 
rights are sorted out can mutually beneficial agreements contingent on those rights 
be contemplated. This suggests that mutually beneficial international flood 
mitigation agreements may require more basic conflicts over rights to be sorted out 
first. 
Several factors soften this pessimism, and provide the basis for our subsequent 
analysis.  While the geography of rivers and underground aquifers creates de facto 
property rights, even when there is no explicit agreement on rights, these property 
rights may be uncertain enough that a certain right to less may be more valuable 
than an uncertain claim to more.  Thus the removal of uncertainty on one or both 
sides in a bilateral negotiation may create the scope for mutually beneficial 
agreement.  One example of the benefits of the removal of uncertainty would be in 
the perceived returns to investments that support the effective management of 
water resources. 
Another way of going beyond a situation of pure conflict is to expand the 
dimension of the bargaining space.  The relinquishing of a property right, or a 
claim to a right, can be compensated by a transfer in the opposite direction, just as 
in any mutually beneficial trade.  The transfer in this case may be of money, 
material goods or intangibles such as security.  This need not involve going outside 
the sphere of conventional diplomacy (including commercial diplomacy), but 
private exchanges may be helpful, for reasons we discuss below. On the other 
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hand, if negotiations over water rights are tied to other relatively intractable 
conflict situations, expanding the space of bargaining may make agreement more 
difficult. Thus, linking the issue of how China controls the water of the Tsangpo 
within its own territory is likely to be complicated by connecting it to the long-
frozen dispute over India’s northeastern boundary. 
While multilateral negotiations do not provide any direct advantage with respect to 
the resolution of property rights conflicts, the different aspects of ameliorating 
conflict that we have outlined apply to multilateral as well as bilateral bargaining 
situations.   
Property rights and investment  
While we have noted above the benefits for water-related investment of a 
transformation of uncertain claims into certain property rights, we earlier pointed 
out the limits of this transformation in the Indus case.  Here we explain these 
limits. As we remarked earlier, the river waters allocated to Pakistan through the 
Indus treaty partly flow through Indian territory.  The treaty rules out consumptive 
uses of this water –such as irrigation – by India. What about nonconsumptive uses 
such as hydroelectric power?  In principle, India should be able to negotiate such 
uses and undertake the investments required.  However, Pakistan might desire to 
monitor the investment to make sure that no water is being diverted.  Such 
monitoring would raise currently insurmountable issues of security and 
sovereignty.  Even greater problems would arise with respect to Pakistani 
investment within Indian territory.  As a result of these issues, the full 
hydroelectric potential of the Chenab and Jhelum remains untapped.8 Both 
Pakistan and India, as we note in Section V, are currently in a race to develop 
hydroelectric projects on the Jhelum. Flood mitigation investments that are made in 
one country to benefit another country are subject to similar potential monitoring 
problems. 
Bilateralism vs. multilateralism 
Bilateralism has been an important aspect of India's policy with respect to its South 
Asian neighbors.  Bilateralism may be justified for all parties in terms of simplicity 
of negotiations or, for some participants in the negotiations, as a way of avoiding 
opposing coalitions and preserving bargaining power.  However, in the case of 
rivers flowing through more than two nations, or where an entire river basin spans 
more than two territories, bilateral bargaining may neglect positive and negative 
externalities, and limit the mutual benefits of possible agreements on water 
development and usage.  Bilateralism combined with conventional barter 
diplomacy may also limit the gains from trade, though in this case it is the lack of 
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fully transferable value that is the culprit, rather than bilateralism.  Hence it is the 
existence of externalities that provides a case for multilateralism over bilateralism 
in negotiations over the management of international river waters. 
Private exchange vs. diplomacy 
Conventional diplomacy is characterized by barter, either involving specific items, 
or of broader scope (general reciprocity).  More and more, over time, diplomacy 
has extended to the commercial sphere, covering international trade and investment 
in particular.  Again, this can involve specific exchanges between governments or, 
instead, the setting of rules under which private parties operate.  Whether the actual 
exchange takes place between governments or private parties depends on who 
owns the potential objects of trade. 
Natural resources such as river waters have conventionally been treated as 
government-owned, and therefore international negotiations over their shared 
development and use have been firmly in the sphere of diplomacy, albeit with 
economic components and economic implications.  Where private parties, such as 
farmers and industrialists, have been the ultimate users of water (for irrigation, 
power and navigation), they have had only an indirect say in such negotiations, 
through political influence or political pressure.  This political model has also 
governed the domestic allocation of water at subnational levels, through politically 
determined pricing and investment subsidies. 
What changes with private involvement in water development decisions, whether 
at the subnational or the international level?  To the extent that ownership is 
transferred to private entities, decision-making will be determined by different 
objective functions.  Private entities may range from corporations that maximize 
profits to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that maximize some aggregate 
measure of their members' welfare.  Though governments may also theoretically 
maximize aggregate welfare, in practice, the incentive mechanisms to enforce this 
may be too weak, particularly at the national level. Thus, even for public goods 
such as flood mitigation, the greater involvement of different stakeholder groups 
may be beneficial: this is the point taken up more explicitly in considering multi-
track diplomacy in the next section. 
Even if ownership is not privatized, when private parties are involved in sharing 
the costs and benefits of water development, their objectives will have a more 
direct impact on decision-making than in the conventional model of political 
influence.  We can think of their participation in contracting and bargaining as 
similar to multilateralism in extending the set of those who bargain.  If this helps to 
internalize externalities, then greater efficiency in bargaining may be realized.  A 
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further benefit goes beyond overcoming externalities.  While the nations in a 
multilateral negotiation are determined by geography, private entities such as 
multinational firms can be asked to compete for seats at the bargaining table, 
enhancing the potential gains to others involved in the negotiation. Competition is 
an important idea here – if the selection of private parties is determined through 
private influence activities, efficiency may be lost. Hence transparency and 
accountability in determining who comes to the table is a first requirement.  
The inclusion of private parties in negotiation over water development and use not 
only changes objectives, but can also make them more transparent.  National 
governments may not have easily identifiable objectives, since they are a complex 
mix of the preferences of constituents, politicians (the agents of constituents) and 
bureaucrats (the agents of politicians).  Lower level governments provide some 
degree of disaggregation, but subnational private entities are required to be more 
open about their goals and performance than is traditional for governments in 
South Asia.  This comes about through home country corporate disclosure 
requirements, assuming that these are strong enough. In this context, the country of 
origin can matter greatly – a Chinese state-owned enterprise will likely by less 
transparent than a private firm from a Western industrialized country. One can 
conjecture that greater transparency will, on the whole, aid agreement in water 
negotiations. 
There are two final implications of the inclusion of private parties.  First, there is, 
perhaps, greater flexibility in the kinds of contracts that can be signed.  In 
principle, there is nothing to stop governments from signing commercial contracts 
(including those specifying sharing of costs and benefits), but there may be 
problems due to incomplete information: in particular, the appearance of possible 
impropriety may prevent even the signing of honest contracts.  This again assumes 
that profit-making entities have better internal monitoring and mitigation 
mechanisms, and accountability to external stakeholders.  A stronger argument is 
based on commitment.  Sovereign governments may not be able to credibly 
commit to certain kinds of agreements, while private parties can.  This simply 
reflects the nature of sovereignty. Governments can expropriate and renege on 
contracts involving private parties, but this may involve greater reputation loss 
than breaking or bending vaguely worded treaties. 
Overall, therefore, it may be that the inclusion of private or nongovernmental 
entities in negotiations over water development and use implies changes more 
profound than those involved in shifting to multilateralism.  At the same time, the 
role of private parties would be impossible or severely limited without both those 
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changes.  We turn now to the recent experience in South Asia, with a focus on 
multi-track diplomacy, as well as multilateralism. 
 
III Multi-Track Diplomacy 
The inclusion of private parties in international negotiations, which we have 
discussed in the previous section, can be subsumed in the general concept of multi-
track diplomacy. Originally, ‘Track II diplomacy’ was distinguished from 
traditional (hence Track I) diplomacy,9 and characterized by third party 
interventions, including the participation of non-policymaking officials and non-
governmental leaders in negotiations. The advantages of this two-track approach 
are thought to include a shift in focus from ‘positions’ to ‘interests’, and an 
avoidance of government officials and policymakers risking their public positions. 
“Since the participants in the discussions are not ultimate decision makers, there 
are no high-level (Track I) public commitments and policy-making.”10  Beyond 
such benefits, there is also the possibility of incorporating economic matters more 
explicitly, as we discussed in the previous section.  
After the original formalization of ‘two-track’ diplomacy, there have been various 
attempts to refine the concept. McDonald and Diamond (1996) elaborated 
McDonald’s initial five-track classification to come up with a nine track ‘system’. 
The nine tracks in this system are government, nongovernmental professionals, 
business, private citizens, researchers and educators, activists, religious 
organizations, funding agencies, and the media. We would tend to agree with 
critics11 that this classification loses analytical crispness. Nevertheless, it highlights 
the different actors and channels of interaction that are possible once official 
avenues of diplomacy are supplemented. Perhaps the most useful distinction is one 
which allows for three tracks, with Track II including all interactions involving 
nongovernmental elites, whereas Track III encompasses grassroots actions by those 
directly involved in, or affected by, the conflict. This classification is what we 
adopt in this paper. 
There are at least two ways in which a wider diplomacy might open new options. 
The first relates to the planning, negotiation and financing of large-scale schemes. 
A wider diplomacy, including new actors with different mandates and incentives, 
could make technically better schemes and, through wider representation, generate 
greater support for them. So, there is the possibility that multi-track diplomacy 
could make large-scale flood mitigation, water storage, irrigation and hydroelectric 
power generation schemes better and more acceptable.  
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The second way in which wider diplomacy might open new options concerns the 
possibilities for small contributions to large-scale water projects. For example, 
there are some advantages to large-scale flood mitigation. For example, large dams 
may store more water than small dams, per unit of land lost under water. Large 
polders may also be more efficient than small embankments. There are also 
advantages to small-scale water development. These may include decentralized 
control, environmental conservation, rural employment generation, and more 
effective representation of diverse needs for water. Small-scale, decentralized 
development of water resources is more likely to be driven by demand than is 
large-scale development. There is, of course, a rich, and only partially documented, 
history of small and large-scale water development in India. That history offers 
examples of small-scale initiatives that could assist flood mitigation as well as 
drought mitigation (Rosin 1993; Agarwal and Narain (eds.) 1997) 
It is possible that multi-track diplomacy could open new possibilities for small-
scale water development, including flood mitigation. For example, the visionary 
suggestion of the ‘Ganges Water Machine’ (Revelle and Lakshminarayana 1975) 
was that decentralized groundwater recharge and pumping, using hydroelectric 
power generated in the upper reaches of the big rivers, could mitigate floods, 
through a large expansion of groundwater recharge, and enable expansion of water 
supply, particularly irrigation, throughout the river basin. Decentralized water 
development of this kind could be socially and environmentally preferable to large 
interventions.  
How might multi-track diplomacy make such a vision possible? Cross-border 
trading in water services could enable the governments of India and Bangladesh, or 
intermediary agencies, possibly including public-private partnerships, to purchase 
flood mitigation and drought services from a range of agencies in Nepal and India. 
Rather than elephantine governments plodding toward large scale water storage 
many decades hence, cross-border trading might enable fleet-footed institutions, be 
they nongovernmental organizations, private companies or public-private 
partnerships, to provide services over a much shorter time span. Is this so different 
from what is envisaged for the sale of power in the India Nepal Power Trade 
Agreement of 1996? There is a history of cross-border trade in electric power. 
Trade in water services would require research and innovation, not least to develop 
appropriate units and prices. It would also require oversight by one or a group of 
regulatory agencies. But it is not unthinkable and it could generate labor-intensive 
employment at the same time as providing flood mitigation and expansion of dry 
season water supply.  
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The evolution of multi-track river diplomacy 
Conventional diplomatic negotiations, i.e., Track I diplomacy, have had limited 
success in the arena of South Asia’s great rivers. There has been little regional 
cooperation in South Asia, least of all about the contentious topic of water. The 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in the 
1980s, provides a forum for discussion of the least controversial topics. However, 
the most heated ones, particularly water resource negotiations, were excluded from 
its brief at the start. With the exception of one meeting in 1986, negotiations over 
water have been exclusively bilateral, that is, involving only two states.  India, in 
fact, has repeatedly insisted on this bilateralism. 
The most heated and long running, river disagreement has been between 
Bangladesh (and its predecessor, East Pakistan) and India over the sharing of the 
flow of the Ganges. This question has sometimes been temporarily settled by 
interim agreements, and has occasionally erupted into internationally publicized 
disagreement. More typically, as for the decade up to 1996, it has been marked by 
chronic lack of agreement: intergovernmental negotiations of varying frequency 
that repeatedly fail to make substantive progress.  
The governments of India and Nepal have had many rounds of sometimes tense 
negotiations relating to hydroelectricity generation, irrigation water, and flood 
mitigation, and early agreements about shared projects have been controversial in 
Nepal. Water has the potential to be Nepal’s major economic resource, and 
successive governments have expected that the sale of hydroelectric power to India 
would generate significant revenues for economic development. Until 1996, little 
progress had been made toward this goal: progress from that point on is considered 
in section V. 
In section IV, two of the most prominent elements obstructing international 
cooperation will be identified and described: the Indian government’s insistence on 
bilateral rather than multilateral negotiations (termed bilateralism) and competing 
national visions for water development.  
Though these obstructions persist, agreements in 1996 and 1997 opened new 
directions in regional cooperation, including:    
i) shifting some negotiations from the diplomatic or governmental 
sphere at least partly into the sphere of the private economy 
ii) bringing third parties, other than governments, into negotiation, 
design and implementation of cooperative projects 
iii) moving toward the sharing of eventual benefits and costs, rather than 
establishing fixed payments based on anticipated outcomes 
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iv)  making steps toward limited multilateral discussion. 
It will be seen that these new directions are all aspects of the conceptual issues 
treated in section II. We discuss them further in the context of the multi-track 
diplomacy framework. 
Multi-track diplomacy and water management 
How might multi-track diplomacy, and specifically the four new directions 
identified above, influence water management possibilities?  
i) Shifting some negotiations from the diplomatic or governmental sphere at least 
partly into the sphere of the private economy  
Social practices with distant origins dictate that certain issues are economic and 
others diplomatic. In the diplomatic sphere, a range of issues of national interest, 
possibly including economic matters, are negotiated by governments. In the private 
economic sphere various exchanges of trade, investment, lending and labor are 
negotiated between private parties, and government regulates only the broad 
framework. 
There are contrasts between diplomatic and private economic practices which 
suggest that there are advantages to the transfer of some international river 
negotiations from diplomacy to commerce. As noted in section II, in the private 
economic sphere, enterprises enter negotiations with clear private incentives, that 
is, to generate a return for owners or shareholders. By contrast, diplomacy involves 
negotiation between governments having multiple objectives and less direct 
incentives, including the approval of bureaucratic superiors and the various 
processes of collective representation or protest. This suggests that negotiations 
within the private economic sphere can have the advantages of simple goals, clear 
rules and pressures for quick completion. The shift from diplomatic to private 
economic negotiation parallels the widely debated processes of privatization and 
liberalization.  
In some cases, the diffuse benefits of water management projects may limit private 
incentives. In particular, flood mitigation is a public good, and may not easily be 
turned into a tradable private good. However, it may be possible to develop trade in 
water storage benefits. The governments of Nepal or China, or a public private 
partnership, for example, might agree to store a quantity of water for their 
downstream neighbors. The payment for this storage might reflect both the benefits 
of flood mitigation as well as the supply of dry season water. Once a market is 
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created for a private good, subsidies can conceivably be used to bring marginal 
private and social benefits more in line with each other. 
ii) Bringing third parties, other than governments, into negotiation, design and 
implementation of cooperative projects.  
The second new direction suggested by the 1996-7 agreements relates to the 
inclusion of third parties such as corporations, local governments and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in international negotiations. This may be 
advantageous if new social, economic and intellectual resources are to be brought 
to bear upon concerns shared across national boundaries. When negotiations are 
shifted from diplomacy to commerce third parties are necessarily involved. A 
further widening can be seen, however, in the growth of nongovernmental 
networks involved in international negotiation about environmental risks and 
possibilities. In particular, the large-scale nature of many water projects, and their 
influence on large populations cutting across existing political boundaries or 
constituencies, can be more effectively addressed by the inclusion of NGOs in 
multi-track diplomacy. Given the heterogeneity of NGOs in terms of size and 
organizational character, this can be thought of as a hybrid of Track II and Track 
III diplomacy.  
iii) Moving toward the sharing of eventual benefits and costs, rather than 
establishing fixed payments based on anticipated outcomes.  
The third new direction relates to the sharing of costs and benefits of international 
environmental change. Situations of uncertainty present a challenge to 
intergovernmental cooperation. In the case of South Asia, climatic and tectonic 
variations combined with the unpredictable consequences of agriculture, land 
clearance, other human interventions, and climate change constitute significant 
sources of uncertainty influencing international environmental negotiations. River 
flows, sediment loads and groundwater levels are only partially predictable. In 
addition, projects to harness natural resources have uncertain benefits and costs.  
In these conditions, the sharing of benefits and costs constitutes a promising 
direction for international cooperation.  This does not, of course, exclude 
governments from this risk sharing: large-scale projects, in particular, will require 
their participation, even if only as guarantors or underwriters. For example, flood 
mitigation is an area where active government participation is essential. In this 
context, the role of multilateral institutions can be seen as providing some risk 
sharing where individual governments may not be able to accomplish it sufficiently 
on their own. 
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iv) Making steps toward limited multilateral discussion.  
The fourth new direction, of multilateralism, has parallels with the second: new 
resources are brought to bear on problems, and unintended negative impacts on 
those otherwise excluded are avoided. Agreements based on multilateral 
consultation and discussion are more likely to be stable in the long run.  In 
addition, there is the possibility of expanding the “gains to trade” by expanding the 
set of bargainers, as discussed in section II.  These issues are taken up further in 
Sections IV and V. Multilateralism represents an innovation that is orthogonal to 
multi-track diplomacy. Interestingly, however, NGOs can informally cut across 
national boundaries (at least through information sharing, and possibly through 
coordinated action) and that aspect of Track II diplomacy may provide an avenue 
for developing multilateralism without formally bringing multiple governments to 
the bargaining table. 
IV Impediments to Agreement: Is there need for a multilateral institution? 
International river negotiations frequently take many decades before agreement can 
be achieved. Water resource cooperation in the basins of the rivers Ganges and 
Brahmaputra may constitute the most complex of all international water 
negotiations. The combined scale of the environmental, social and technical issues 
raised by the Himalayan rivers has no equivalent anywhere else in the world. 
Given the scale of these problems, and the paucity of regional resources that can be 
garnered to address them,12 it is not surprising that the negotiation of international 
cooperation should be protracted and uncertain. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the 
past focus on bilateral negotiations, and on national, rather than regional, 
perspectives, has slowed the achievement of cooperation and river development.13   
Here we focus on India's policy of bilateralism, and its consequences for India, 
Bangladesh and Nepal in past river negotiations. Bilateralism has been a consistent 
Indian government prerequisite for negotiations with its South Asian neighbors 
ever since Independence in 1947. Almost all negotiations about a range of key 
issues, from river development to trade and transit, have been negotiated on that 
basis.  
Rose (1987) identifies bilateralism as one of two main principles of Indian 
government policy towards its neighbors, acceptance of India as the major regional 
power being the other.  He describes bilateralism:  
As defined by India, the South Asian system would function through the 
greater coordination of India’s bilateral economic relations with the 
other regional states; any substantial integration of the economies of the 
other states (e.g., Pakistan and Sri Lanka or Nepal and Bangladesh) or 
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any use of a multilateral approach to regional economic issues (e.g., the 
river systems of Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and India) should be 
discouraged. 
This policy of bilateralism is a complex aspect of Indian foreign policy. We argue 
here that it constitutes a serious obstacle to achieving the potential of South Asian 
water resource development. Two alternative perspectives on bilateralism can be 
identified. 
Firstly, spokespersons for the Indian Ministry of External Affairs have emphasized 
the additional complexity and duration implied by multilateral negotiations14. In 
this perspective, bilateral negotiations on specific bilateral questions or projects are 
more expeditious than multilateral negotiations. This argument is plausible, but has 
to be tempered by the experience of delays in bilateral negotiations between the 
Indian government and its neighbors.  
A second perspective on bilateralism, sometimes found in political and academic 
discussion in Nepal and Bangladesh, is that bilateralism allows India to dominate 
the subcontinent, presumably by hindering the formation of a “bargaining 
coalition” by India's neighbors.  This perspective may have historical validity but 
gives little immediate purchase on current questions of cooperation. It is also 
unclear to what extent, and in what ways, it actually impinges upon Indian 
governmental discussions and decisions. One important point to note is that the 
inclusion of China in any regional discussion of water management will have a 
profound impact on the bargaining occasion, and will have to be structured 
carefully to overcome potential Indian concerns. 
The emphasis on bilateral relations leads to a particular focus on the sequence of 
issues that have dominated the relations between two governments. It has been 
argued that this focus encourages the perception that river development is a ‘zero 
sum game,’ a common obstacle in international river discussions.15  This 
perception, that the gain of one country is necessarily the loss of the other, gives 
the negotiations a particular charge: any compromise of prior national objectives 
can be portrayed as a victory for the other side.  Whether this perception is rational 
is another matter, however: even bilateral situations may involve mutual gains.  
The real question is whether multilateralism might substantially expand the gains -- 
enough to overcome additional complexity or bargaining costs. 
The focus on histories of bilateral relations may also create fertile ground for the 
growth of myths about the nature and possibilities of those relations. In the case of 
India and Bangladesh, perceptions of river negotiations are deeply influenced by 
the history and myths of past negotiation over one project, India’s Farakka Barrage 
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across the Ganges. All subsequent discussion about water between these two 
governments, and in their national media, tends to be mired in the myths and 
colored by the particular paths of past bilateral relations.16  
These myths, with complex foundations in the colonial division of the 
subcontinent, as well as in the technical uncertainties and ambiguities of water 
development, posit negotiations over water as a ‘zero-sum game’. This structuring 
of the discussion leaves little space for the possibility that water development could 
be an enterprise from which all sides gain much more than they lose. The 
boundaries of discussion could be relaxed in the context of regional, in place of 
bilateral, discussion. 
Examination of the historical record and of national water proposals (Crow and 
Singh 2000: 1911-1913) illustrates how nationally constituted visions of water 
resource development frequently overlook the concerns of neighbors. Thus, when 
India and Bangladesh approached Nepal, the concerns of Nepal were overlooked. 
And, when India decided to build the Farakka Barrage in the early 1960s, Nehru 
was convinced (presumably by his engineers) that it would cause ‘no real injury’ 
downstream.  
Recent visions of national water development express national visions making little 
accommodation to the concerns of other states. There has been no recognition that 
compromise might achieve greater benefits for the region.  To some extent, these 
visions were shaped by the failure of conventional bilateral diplomacy.  In section 
V, we examine recent innovations and future directions that may overcome this 
failure. 
V Innovations at the international level 
At the end of this section we describe the design and construction of large 
hydroelectric projects on the rivers draining from the Tibetan Plateau into South 
Asia. This phase, involving many projects started or under active consideration, at 
least one, the Tsangpo, expected to be twice as large as the world’s largest 
hydroelectric scheme (the Three Gorges), raises questions of conflict (over China’s 
diversion of water, over unresolved territorial claims between India and China), 
and overlooks a range of potential mutual benefits. Table 1 lists some of the wide 
range of water services that South Asian governments have sought from each other 
in relation to regional water resources.  Potentially there are a set of regional 
benefits beyond the immediate concern of hydroelectric power. The beginning of a 
more flexible and inclusive framework for achieving such benefits was set by the 
agreements of 1996-7.  
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By examining innovations at the international level, we aim to bring out the 
general principles that can transform international negotiations over water rights 
and usage.  These general principles include rights allocation mechanisms, 
governing institutions, and rules for exchange.   
Five International Agreements 
The four 1996 agreements17 establish innovations for South Asia, with only limited 
precedent elsewhere, which start to address the uncertainties of Himalayan 
development, and bring new resources and initiative to the process of harnessing 
the geographical assets of South Asia. They begin creating a regional trade in 
hydroelectric power development, with sharing of the costs, risks and benefits of 
joint river development. The fifth agreement, in 1997, tentatively established 
arrangements for multilateral discussion.  
In broad terms, the India-Nepal Power Trade agreement transfers negotiations for 
the sale of hydroelectric power from the purely diplomatic to the economic sphere, 
and in doing so brings agencies other than national government into the process. 
The Mahakali Treaty establishes a process of sharing future benefits of water 
resource development on the Mahakali River (the border river between Western 
Nepal and India). The Tala Hydel Project negotiations illustrate a process similar 
to that envisaged in the Mahakali Treaty, at a later stage of negotiation. The 
Ganges Treaty resolves 40 years of dispute about dividing the low flow of that 
river.   
In principle, the 1996-7 treaties established a basis for the steps discussed in 
Sections II Facilitating Cooperation and III Multi-track Diplomacy. The India-
Nepal Power Trade agreement has potential to assist in the establishment of 
property rights,  and to shift some negotiations from diplomatic to private 
transactions (track II diplomacy). The Mahakali Treaty provides an important 
precedent for dealing with uncertainty in river development, one which could be 
extended to encompass uncertainties resulting from glacial melting. Then, the 1997 
agreement made tentative steps toward multilateral discussion.  
Difficulties in progress: The complexity of the Mahakali agreement, its vagueness 
with respect to details, political changes and uncertainty in India and Nepal, and 
even external events such as the collapse of Enron have all hampered progress 
between those two nations. In the Enron case, however, the difficulty of identifying 
and incorporating the benefits of flood mitigation played a role in delaying 
implementation. While internal Nepali politics and Enron’s own maneuvering were 
more public problems, it has also been recognized that India was reluctant to admit 
that it would receive benefits from irrigation, and especially flood mitigation, in 
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addition to the ability to purchase power. Enron itself also downplayed the 
importance of the latter, since it could not contract for those benefits. 
 
India’s somewhat unilateral approach also continues in the case of older 
agreements with Nepal. Under the Kosi agreement, India built a dam across the 
Kosi River in Nepal to control floods in its own state of Bihar during the monsoon 
season, as well as supply extra water to the state in the dry season. However, the 
diversion of the Kosi for flood prevention in Bihar submerges arable land in Bihar, 
destroying standing crops and temporarily dislocating residents of the area in 
Nepal. The problem is four decades old, but remains unresolved.18
Consolidating diplomatic innovations: While these five agreements established 
important precedents, the potential for reduced conflict and greatly improved 
regional development has only partly been realized in agreements enacted by 2008. 
It is for this reason that we propose, in Section VI, that a new independent 
regulatory body could be established to facilitate the potential for regional benefits, 
and more effective representation.  
The new phase of Himalayan hydroelectrics 
A wave of hydroelectric dam construction is starting in the Himalayan valleys of 
Nepal, Pakistan and India (refs). One major project, the 750 MW West Seti scheme 
in Nepal, appears to be in the early stages of construction. In the Western 
Himalayas both India and Pakistan are planning hydroelectric projects and in the 
Eastern Himalayas India is planning a number of large projects and possibly many 
smaller ones. Several of these projects involve complex combinations of 
multilateral diplomacy, multi-year power purchase agreements, and multilateral 
financing and construction arrangements. A range of development banks and 
national banks (notably China’s Exim Bank), foreign construction companies from 
Australia, Sweden and Germany, and financing consortia are involved in the 
hydroelectric projects getting underway. 
Table 2 shows the larger (generally over 400 MW) Himalayan water projects 
currently scheduled, under construction or in detailed design. One source 
(Dharmadhikary 2008) suggests that by September 2007, 39 Memoranda of 
Understanding had been signed by the Indian Government, with both private and 
public developers, in Arunachal Pradesh alone. This would generate 24,000 MW, 
roughly equivalent to the total amount of power generating capacity installed in 
India since Independence. A large part of Arunachal Pradesh is still claimed by 
China. The Chinese Ambassador to New Delhi re-stated in 2005 (IRNA 2005) that 
the land was disputed. The site of one project, the 11,000 MW Upper Siang Project 
has already been relocated because of China’s concerns (Sasi 2006). Nonetheless, 
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the Indian Prime Minister laid a foundation stone for one of the larger projects, the 
3000 MW Dibang multi-purpose project on January 31 2008. Oddly, the stone was 
laid in Itanagar, the capital of Arunachal, 600 km from the dam site 
(Dharmadhikary 2008).  
China’s proposed Yarlung-Tsangpo hydroelectric scheme is intended to generate 
40,000 MW, even more electricity than the 39 dams proposed in Arunachal 
Pradesh. It is to be sited in what’s known as the ‘great bend’ of the river at Namcha 
Barwa in Eastern Tibet, a point where the river drops 3000 m in 200 km. This is a 
location long known by engineers as a site with unrivaled potential for hydro-
electricity. China also proposes to divert large, but so far not publicly divulged, 
quantities of water from the Tsangpo several hundred kilometers to Xinjiang and 
Giansu. One source (Tsering 2002) describes the potential for conflict between 
China and its downstream neighbors:  
This project represents a direct threat to the water security of people living downstream 
in India and Bangladesh… Precipitation in the region is “too much” (80%) during the 
four monsoon months (between June to September), and “too little” (20%) for the 
remaining eight months.84 China will withhold water for power generation and irrigation 
during the dry season, but would be compelled to release water during the flood season. 
Diversion of large quantities of water to China’s northwest would be even more 
devastating for farmers and fishermen downstream. 
 
Despite the ongoing reformation of the Nepalese government (Vanaik 2008), 
Nepal signed a Memorandum of Understanding with India on March 2nd 2008 to 
construct the 400 MW Arun III hydroelectric project. This is a project from which 
the World Bank withdrew funding after opposition from environmentalists. It is to 
be constructed over the next five years, once financing has been arranged, under a 
build-operate-own-and-transfer (BOOT) agreement with Sutlej Jal Vidayut, a joint 
venture of the Indian and Himachal Pradesh governments. Under this arrangement, 
SJV constructs and operates the project for 30 years, then hands it to the Nepal 
government. In addition to royalties (7.5% of income) and taxes (0.5% of exports), 
the Nepal government has arranged to receive 22% of the power from the project 
without payment.  
In some cases these projects are associated with reduced tensions between the two 
countries most immediately involved. This seems to be the case for those projects 
involving India and Nepal. Elsewhere, there are signs that the projects are 
exacerbating tensions. Pakistan appears to be in a race to get the 963 MW Neelum 
Jheelum project started before India’s 330 MW Kishanganga project, located 
upstream on the same river, can be completed. Both these rivers fall under the 
 20
Indus Treaty. In the East, India’s rejuvenated dam proposals on the Tipaimukh, 
Dihang and Subansiri rivers are causing unease in Bangladesh.  
This wave of dam construction is proceeding in the absence of a plan to optimize 
the regional benefits (and minimize the environmental costs) of water management, 
and with little concern for alternative proposals. The outcomes of these schemes 
may have repercussions, and potential benefits, for countries not currently involved 
in negotiations. The significant involvement of the Chinese government, and its 
Exim Bank, in financing the Pakistan and Nepal projects suggests there could be 
value in bringing China to regional negotiations.  
Indian foreign policy needs to look ahead to the difficulties of negotiating with 
China over projects in the Eastern Himalayas, such as the Dihang, Dibang and 
Subansiri, located on land claimed by both India and China since the 1961 war. In 
addition, the need for regional analysis of the consequences of global warming, the 
involvement of China in financing several projects on the South Asian side of the 
Himalayas, and the need to discuss projects in Tibet which could have 
consequences for South Asia, all provide justification for the establishment of a 
multilateral regulatory institution. 
 
VI Conclusion: A Way Forward 
Three kinds of obstacle have constrained intergovernmental negotiations over 
water in the past, and contributed to the rise of significant tensions between states. 
Firstly, the strict practice of bilateral negotiation has put blinkers on the 
discussants, exaggerating the importance of past disagreements, limiting 
discussants’ ability to evaluate the regional potential for cooperation, and 
encouraging the rise of myths about the malevolent roles and limited needs of 
neighboring states. Secondly, the construction of grand national plans for river 
development has tended to crowd out plans with benefits for other nations or for 
the whole region. Thirdly, the limits of bilateral diplomacy have been confined 
further by the restrictions of barter exchange. Transactions are only possible, in 
this type of exchange, when each government has what the other government 
wants.  
The expansion of diplomacy in ways prefigured by the agreements of 1996 and 
1997 could overcome these obstacles of bilateralism, grand nationalism and barter 
diplomacy. Could negotiations about international river water management be 
taken out of diplomatic barter and transferred to negotiations among private and 
public-private agencies? This transfer would require the design and unfolding of a 
 21
suitable regulatory framework. That framework could embody the concerns of 
sovereignty which currently limit the topic to interactions among states. It could 
also clarify property rights in water, and incorporate the latest thinking on 
unresolved environmental questions, such as those relating to falling groundwater 
aquifers and the looming impacts of climate change, which threatens water sources 
in a manner hitherto unimaginable. With an appropriate regulatory structure, cross-
border transactions involving water services could be a significant source of 
employment, economic growth and livelihood security. 
Our discussion of multi-track diplomacy gives us a conceptual framework for 
postulating some specific features of a potential regulatory institution. First, the 
technical issues involved in planning for the future with respect to water 
management in the region are highly complex. An international panel of experts 
focused on the specific characteristics and challenges of the regions river basins 
would be an essential part of a future solution. Participation by the governments 
concerned is also necessary, of course, and one would expect it to be through the 
appointment of seasoned foreign policy experts. Participation by national and 
international NGOs and even private sector bodies such as industry associations 
(rather than individual firms) would round out the membership of a new regulatory 
body. In terms of our multi-track classification, this would represent a hybrid of 
Tracks I and II, with the weight toward the latter. Track III would be implicitly 
present through grassroots linkages of NGOs – grassroots activism would be 
difficult to incorporate directly into the envisaged framework. A parallel 
suggestion for an independent body to deal with South Asian environmental issues 
was made by a report to the UNDP (Romm, Rose and Crow 1997). The case for a 
regulatory body is made more pressing than it was in that report by the issues of 
China’s development of the Tsangpo and the uncertainties raised by climate 
change and glacial melting.  
Unlike the case of SAARC, or even bodies that are designed to address 
international or cross-border environmental issues, the focus of the proposed body 
would be specifically on water management, with environmental issues such as 
climate change, pollution, groundwater depletion and soil degradation being a 
natural component of a focus on quality as well as quantity of water. This focus 
would distinguish such an institution from SAARC, or other kinds of regional 
organizations. In any case, the need to include China implies that a delinking from 
SAARC would be essential. Even then, the fact that some basin issues are strictly 
bilateral (though less so when climate change is factored in) would require 
something of a hybrid structure, so that different river basins might be addressed 
only by subsets of the membership. The opportunity to link and compare bilateral 
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issues would still be valuable of course, as information-sharing about technical 
matters could enhance the quality of specific basin solutions. 
China’s presence in such a body would unavoidably change the strategic balance of 
South Asian river discussions, especially in the direction of reducing India’s 
bargaining power, or ability to act relatively unilaterally as a result of its dominant 
position in South Asia. Yet the ability of China to drastically affect water supplies 
throughout South Asia, particularly as the impacts of climate change become more 
severe, means that its inclusion is necessary and potentially valuable to all parties. 
Through the presence of official government representatives in a regulatory body, 
there will inevitably be an implicit linkage between river water issues and other 
strategic interests such as trade and national boundaries. However, the presumed 
virtue of the multi-track approach is precisely to temper or ameliorate such 
conflicts, by keeping them contained, and by focusing on achieving agreement 
where mutually beneficial gains to cooperation are available, through investment, 
contractual relationships or integrated technical analysis. 
At one level, the proposed institution may be seen as an international multi-basin 
version of bodies that attempt to regulate single river basins within national 
boundaries. In such cases, there are also subnational entities, such as states or 
provinces, with differing interests. One obvious difference is that a national 
government can exercise overriding sovereignty in such cases. With federal 
structures or relatively powerful or influential subnational governments, this 
exercise of sovereignty may be available only through carrots rather than sticks. In 
the absence of a world government, coalitions of national interests as represented 
through multilateral agencies may play a role, just as the World Bank did in the 
case of the Indus Waters Treaty.  
To the extent that multilateral agencies are dominated by specific national interests 
(the US for the World Bank, or Japan for the Asian Development Bank), this may 
not be too different from the perspective articulated in Sahni (2006), where a case 
is made for the US to further its strategic foreign policy interests by improving 
cooperation between India and Pakistan with respect to the Indus. The problem 
with such overt attention, of course, is that it brings traditional Track I approaches 
more to the forefront, perhaps diverting focus from the kinds of cooperation 
envisaged in this paper. The history of management of the Mekong basin, from the 
control of colonial powers to a Mekong River Commission that does not include 
major upstream nations (China and Burma), indicates some of the problems with 
traditional nationalist approaches to multilateral cooperation, as well as the 
limitations of investment-oriented multilateral institutions. Of course there is no 
ideal or easy solution to these tradeoffs, and the success of any such institution 
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such as the one proposed here depends on the specifics of design and 
implementation. The Mekong River Commission can provide a starting point for 
thinking about the appropriate institutional design. The importance and urgency of 
the problem, to our minds, requires some institutional innovation, and design and 
implementation can only follow putting the idea on the agenda of policymakers in 
the countries at risk from future water shortages and crises. 
    
 
 24
References 
 
Adnan, S. and A. M. Sufiyan (1993). State of the FAP: Contradictions between 
Policy Objectives and Plan Implementation. Dhaka, Research and Advisory 
Services. 
Agarwal, A. and S. Narain, Eds. (1997). Dying Wisdom: The rise, fall and 
potential of India's traditional water harvesting systems. New Delhi, Centre for 
Science and Environment. 
Ahmad, Q. K. and A. U. Ahmed (2003). “Regional Cooperation in Flood 
Management in the Ganges-Brahmaputra Region: Bangladesh Perspective.” 
Natural Hazards 28: 181-98. 
Ahmad, Q K, et al, (1993), Resources, Environment and National Development 
with Particular Reference to the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Barak Basins, Bangladesh 
Unnayan Parishad, Academic Publishers, Dhaka.  
Ahmad, Q. K., Verghese, B. G., Iyer, R. R., Pradhan, B. B., & Malla, S. K. (1994). 
Converting Water into Wealth: Regional Cooperation in Harnessing the Eastern 
Himalayan Rivers. Delhi: Centre for Policy Research; Kathmandu: Institute for 
Integrated Development Studies; Dhaka: Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad.   
Barnett, T. P., J. C. Adam & D. P. Lettenmaier (2005). Potential impacts of a 
warming climate on water availability in snow-dominated regions. nature Vol 438 
17 November 2005|doi:10.1038 
Bavly, Michael (1999), Second Track Diplomacy, 
http://www.shalam.org/Second%20Track%20Diplomacy.htm  
Boyce, James (1987) Agrarian Impasse in Bengal Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Burns, John (1997) ‘Sharing Ganges Waters, India and Bangladesh Test the Depth 
of Cooperation’, New York Times, May 25, International Section, p10. 
Chapman, G and Thomson M (eds) (1995) Water and the Quest for Sustainable 
Development in the Ganges Valley.  
Crow, Ben (1998) 'New actors and new space for environmental agreement', Water 
Nepal, 6, 1, 25-41. 
Crow, Ben 1996. Review of "Water and the Quest for Sustainable Development in 
the Ganges Valley." Geographical Journal 162, (2) (July): 224. 
 25
Crow, Ben with Alan Lindquist and David Wilson, (1995), Sharing the Ganges: the 
politics and technology of river development, New Delhi and Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Crow, Ben and Nirvikar Singh (2000) "Impediments and innovation in 
international rivers: the waters of South Asia." World Development 28(11): 1907-
1925, January.   
Darmadhikary, Shripad (2008). Hydel Power in the Indian North East: Massive 
Dam Plans for Arunachal. India Together, March 3.  
Dixit, A. (2003). “Floods and vulnerability: Need to Rethink Flood Management.” 
Natural Hazards 28: 155-179. 
Falkenmark , M and J Lundquist (1995) ‘Looming water crisis: new approaches 
are inevitable’ pp 209-210, in Ohlsson, L (ed) Hydropolitics, London: Zed Press. 
Gyawali, Dipak,  and Ajaya Dixit (eds) 1994 Himalaya-Ganga: Contending with 
Complexity special issue of Water Nepal, 4, 1, September.  
Haddad, Deborah (1996), Re: 2-Track Diplomacy & 2-Level Games, 
http://csf.colorado.edu/forums/isafp/96/0334.html 
Hussein, Neila (1995) ‘Book Review: Sharing the Ganges’, BIISS Journal, 16,3, 
pp 437-449 
IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency) 2005. IRNA India-China. New Delhi, 
April 5. 
Iyer, R (1999) ‘Conflict Resolution: Three River Treaties’ unpublished manuscript, 
May. 
Iyer, R (forthcoming) ‘The Indo-Bangladesh Ganga Waters Dispute’ Journal of 
South Asian Studies 
McDonald, John and Louise Diamond (1996), Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems 
Approach to Peace, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. 
Milly P. C. D., K. A. Dunne & A. V. Vecchia (2005). Global pattern of trends in 
streamflow and water availability in a changing climate. Nature Vol 438 17 
November 2005|doi:10.1038/ 
Montville, Joseph V. (1982) “Foreign Policy According to Freud,” Foreign Policy 
(Winter).   
 26
Montville, Joseph V. (1987), “The Arrow and The Olive Branch: A Case For Track 
Two Diplomacy” Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy., eds. John W. 
McDonald and Diane B. Bendahmane Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute. 
Nepal-Press-Digest (1996a). Agreement on Power Trade. Nepal Press Digest (Feb. 
19). 
Nepal-Press-Digest (1996b). The Mahakali Treaty: Special Report. Nepal Press 
Digest, 40 (38 (September 16)), (Gorkhapatra, Sep 12) 326-8. 
Ohlsson, L 1995 ‘The role of water and the origins of conflict’ pp22-3, in Ohlsson, 
L (ed) Hydropolitics, London: Zed Press. 
Paul, B. K. (1995). “Farmers' Responses to the FAP of Bangladesh: An Empirical 
Study.” World Development 23(2): 299-309. 
Phadke, R. (2002). “Assessing water scarcity and watershed development in 
Maharashtra, India: A case study of the Baliraja Memorial Dam.” Science, 
Technology and Human Values 287(2): 236-61. 
Revelle, R. and V. Lakshminarayana (1975). “The Ganges Water Machine.” 
Science 188(4188): 611-616. 
Rogers, P., Lydon, P., Seckler, D., & Pitman, G. T. K. (1994). Water and 
Development in Bangladesh: A Retrospective on the Flood Action Plan  (Report 
prepared for the Bureau for Asia and the Near East of USAID. Irrigation Support 
Project for Asia and the Near East. 
Romm, G, L Rose and B Crow (1997). Report to UNDP on South Asian Rivers.  
Rose, L. (1987). India's regional policy: nonmilitary dimensions. In S. P. Cohen 
(Eds.), The Security of South Asia: American and Asian perspectives Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Rosin, R. T. (1993). “The Tradition of Groundwater Irrigation in Northwestern 
India.” Human Ecology 21(1): 51-86.  
Sahni, Hamir K. (2006), The Politics of Water in South Asia: The Case of the Indus 
Waters Treaty, SAIS Review - Volume 26, Number 2, Summer-Fall, pp. 153-165 
Sasi, Anil 2006. Upper Siang project likely to be relocated on Chinese concerns. 
The Hindu. Friday, March 24. 
 27
Sharma, Kalpana (1999), “Harnessing Rivers – II ”, The Hindu, Chennai, April 28, 
accessed at 
http://www.panos.org.np/programmes/water_articles/hindu_harnessing_river2.htm 
Thapa, Bhekh, et al (eds.), 1995, Water Resources and National Development: 
Nepalese Perspectives. Kathmandu: Institute for Integrated Development Studies. 
Tsering, Tashi (2002). Hydrologic: Water for Human Development. An Analysis of 
China’s Water Management and Politics. Tibet Justice Center: 2002 
Vanaik, Achin (2008). The New Himalayan Republic. New Left Review. 49, Jan/ 
Feb, 47-76.  
Verghese, B. G., and R.R. Iyer (eds.), 1993, Harnessing the Eastern Himalayan 
Rivers: Regional Cooperation in South Asia, Centre for Policy Research, Konark, 
New Delhi.  
Verghese, B. G. (1990). Waters of hope: Himalaya-Ganga development and 
cooperation for a billion people. New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing.   
Wood, G. (1999). “Contesting water in Bangladesh: Knowledge, rights and 
governance.” Journal of International Development(11): 731-54. 
World-Bank-Bangladesh (1997). Water Resource Management in Bangladesh: 
steps towards a new national water plan, World Bank.  
  
 28
 29
TABLE 1 POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN SOUTH ASIA19
Potential 
parties 
Good or service (Exchange: † occurring 
to some extent, * discussed, Ω suggested)  
Type of exchange 
anticipated 
Nepal to India Supply of hydro-electric power * Monetized 
 Supply of water storage benefits20 *  Barter exchange 
India to Nepal Navigation and transit †* Barter exchange 
 Provision of finance for construction * Monetized 
 Provision of engineering expertise * Probably monetized 
India to 
Bangladesh 
Supply of water storage benefits * Barter exchange 
 Granting secure expectations of minimum 
flow * 
Barter exchange 
Bangladesh to 
India 
Navigation and transit rights *  Barter exchange 
 Transfer of water from Brahmaputra to 
Ganges Ω 
Barter exchange 
Bangladesh to 
Nepal 
Navigation and transit rights Ω Barter exchange 
Nepal to 
Bangladesh 
Supply of hydro-electric power Ω Monetized 
 Supply of water storage benefits Ω Barter exchange 
Bhutan to India Supply of hydro-electric power † Monetized 
 Supply of water storage benefits Ω Barter exchange 
India to Bhutan Navigation and transit † Barter exchange 
 Provision of finance and engineering for 
construction † 
Partly monetized 
 
 
Project and size Location Current position and parties 
China   
Yarlung-Tsangpo Dam 40,000 MW 
and diversion  
Namcha Barwa E Tibet, great 
bend of the Tsangpo/Bra hmaputra 
Construction to start 2009. Unknown share of waters of the 
Tsangpo to be diverted to provinces of Xinjiang and Gansu. Indian 
Power Ministry  said they could  buy power 
India    
Baglihar  Kashmir, Chenab River -> Indus 
(2005 complaint to  Bank? ) 
 
Dibang 300 0MW multipurpose  Dibang river, E AP, Arunachal 
Pradesh 
Fndn stone laid in Ita nagar by PM Jan 08 
Kishangang a hydel and storage 330 
MW 
Kishengang a river, Gurez valley 
India Indus  
Swiss arbitrator  to settle dispute.  Construction  by Kishenganga 
Contractors  (Swedish consortium)  
Ranganido 405  MW Dikrong River, Arunachal Commissioned  2002 NEEPCO 
Siang (Dihang) Three projects: 
Upper (11000 MW) middle  (1000 
MW) and lower (1600 MW) 
Siang River Upper Siang site moved downstream to prevent flooding  in Tibet. 
Awaiting data from China  
Subansiri (Lower) 2000 MW West Siang Dist, Arunachal NHPC. Alstom beats Bhel? 
Tipaimukh 1500 MW Barak, Kushia ra, -> Meghna, 
Assam, Manipur, Mizo ram 
Protests India  and Bd. Flood other goals wd make unfeasible. 
NEEPCO implementing 
Nepal   
Arun III 402MW hydel Arun river E Nepal. Rive r origins  
in Tibet.  
MOU signed 3/2/08.  Construction  to be completed 5 yrs after 
finance arranged Sutlej  Jal Vidyut.  BOOT for 30 yrs. 22% of power 
free to Nepal. + royalties  (7.5% income) and export  taxes (0.5%) 
Pancheshwar 6000 MW Mahakali river Nepal/India  border Nepal-India Treaty signed 1996 but disagreement over resettlement 
and electricity pr ice 
Burhi Gandaki 600 MW   
Karnali-Chisapani 1 0,800 MW  Enron sought cont ract 
West Seti 750 MW Nepal Completion  2013. Const 
start nov 07  
China Exim Bank SMEC. SMEC to do with BOOT?  West Seti 
Holdings owned by SMEC. PTC 4.9 c per kw 
Pakistan   
Neelum Jhelum Hy del 963MW  Pak seeks $800 m from WB, ADB, IDB 3 Chinese companies? 
MOU 2006? 
Diamer Bhasha $4 bn  Announced 2006 Lahmeyer const blacklisted  
TABLE 2: LARGER HYDROELECTRIC AND DIVERSION PROJECTS IN THE HIMALAYAS CURRENTLY IN PLANNING OR CONSTRUCTION 
1 
Endnotes 
                                           
1 By one estimate there are more poor people in the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin than in all sub-
Saharan Africa: Rogers et al (1994).  
2 The topography of these rivers is, briefly, as follows.  The Indus and its tributaries begin in the 
Himalayas and their foothills, then flow west and southwest through Kashmir and (Indian and 
Pakistani) Punjab, and finally southwest to the Arabian Sea through Sindh in Pakistan.  The 
Ganges has its headwaters in the Himalayas of Nepal, China and India. It flows south from the 
Himalayas, before turning east to dominate the geography of North India as it flows through the 
states of the Ganges plain (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal) and into Bangladesh, where it 
turns south as it joins the Brahmaputra before emptying into the Bay of Bengal. The 
Brahmaputra flows west to east through much of the length of the Tibet region of China (where 
it is called the Tsangpo), before falling 7,500 ft from the Himalayas to the plains of Assam, and 
turning through almost 180 degrees to flow east to west, then it turns south into Bangladesh, 
where it joins the Ganges. 
3 For example: Verghese (1990), Gyawali and Dixit (eds) (1994), Ahmad, et al (1994), Verghese 
and Iyer (eds.) (1993), Ahmad et al (1993), Thapa, et al (eds.) (1995).  
4 See Verghese (1990).  
5 This section is based heavily on Crow and Singh (2000). 
6 For example, one player in the prisoner's dilemma may assign a small probability to the 
possibility that the opponent simply plays "tit-for-tat". 
7 The "lemons problem" arises when one party in a transaction does not have complete 
information about the value of the trade.  For example, a potential buyer may be uncertain about 
the quality of a good being sold.  If the buyer uses average quality as a basis for making offers, 
high quality goods are withdrawn from the market, leaving only "lemons".  Mutually beneficial 
trades then fail to be consummated. 
8 This discussion is based on conversations of the second author with Indian officials of the 
Indus Waters Commission. 
9 Joseph V. Montville, a former U.S Foreign Service officer, apparently introduced the term 
Track Two Diplomacy in 1982 (Montville, 1982).  In his words, Track II Diplomacy signifies 
“unofficial, nonstructured interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations that is 
directed toward conflict resolution through addressing psychological factors.” (Montville, 1987). 
10 See Haddad (1996). 
11 See, for example, Bavly (1999). 
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12 The existence of conflict over the rivers, and the absence of coordination of development has 
made international agencies, such as the World Bank, unwilling to fund river development 
projects on these rivers. 
13 One successful, if limited, bilateral negotiation, culminated in the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 
between India and Pakistan.  See Crow and Singh (2000). 
14 Interviews with the first author.  
15 See the discussion in section II, of conflict situations. See also Ohlsson (1995).  
16 A more detailed description of these histories can be found in Crow and Singh (2000).  
17  Formally, the four agreements are these:  
i) The India-Nepal power trade agreement (Agreement between His Majesty’s Government of 
Nepal and the Government of India concerning the Electric Power Trade, February 17th 1996) 
ii) The Mahakali Treaty (Treaty between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the 
Government of India concerning the Integrated development of the Mahakali River including 
Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage and Pancheshwar Project, January 29th 1996).  
iii) The India-Bangladesh Treaty on Sharing the Ganges: The Treaty Between the 
Government of the Republic of India and The Government of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, 12th December 1996.The text 
of this Treaty is published in The Independent , Dhaka, December 14 1996.   
iv) Agreement for the Tala Hydel Project signed by representatives of India and Bhutan in 
March 1996 (‘Bhutan and India sign Tala Hydel Project’ Kuensel 3/9/96 p1, 12).  
Crow (1998) also considers these agreements.  Iyer (1999) discusses the Mahakali and Ganges 
Treaties, along with the older Indus Treaty.   
18 Problems with the Kosi extend to the nature of downstream solutions also. Flood mitigation 
embankments built in northern Bihar state have contibuted to permanent waterlogging. Natural 
flooding has perhaps been replaced with a worse outcome (Sharma, 1999). The problem here is 
not transboundary spillovers, but simply one of neglecting the knowledge and interests of local 
experts and residents. In this sense, one can argue that a multi-track approach is warranted as 
well for purely internal flood mitigation issues. 
19 Based on Crow, et al, 1995, Table 18, Ch 8. 
20 Including water storage for dry season irrigation and monsoon flood mitigation.  
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